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Ineffective institutions and bad governance increase transaction costs and reduce international transport flows. In this paper, we empirically
investigate this basic notion, and we show that it can account for several, so far, somewhat puzzling results in the empirical literature estimating
gravity equations of bilateral trade. More specifically, we show that differences in the quality and effectiveness of institutions offer an explanation for
the tendency of OECD countries to trade disproportionately with each other, and with non-OECD countries, as well as for the positive effect of GDP
per capita on bilateral trade.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Reductions in transport costs are important drivers
behind increased specialization and associated increases
in welfare. They contribute to complex network structures
and increased interdependencies between actors across the
globe, but also to increased flows of goods and services
with oftentimes substantial negative impacts on, for ex-
ample, environmental quality and traffic safety. It is more
and more recognised that institutional quality and the
quality of governance is an important determinant of
variations in transport costs. Where traditional studies
have proxied the importance of transport costs for ex-
plaining trade by simple measures of distance, more re-
cent contributions have explicitly paid attention to
institutional quality as one of the key dimensions of trans-
port costs1-3.
This paper aims to contribute to our understanding
of the quantitative importance of institutions in explain-
ing variation in bilateral trade. Institutions are defined as
formal rules and informal practices devised to reduce the
uncertainty in exchange. The quality of institutions affects
the transaction costs incurred in trade, explaining the im-
portance of effective domestic institutions for trade4. We
will exploit this simple notion that institutions matter to
try and resolve two existing puzzles in the gravity litera-
ture, in which the intensity of bilateral trade is explained
by a range of explanatory variables such as the economic
mass of the trading partners, distance between the trad-
ing partners, etc.
The first puzzle was explicitly identified in a recent
study by Rose5 who concluded that membership in the
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development) has a strong and robust positive effect on
trade. He argued that this finding was somewhat of a sur-
prise, because the OECD neither has the formal power
to enforce trade liberalization, nor is it exclusively dedi-
cated to the purpose of liberalization. Why, then, do OECD
member countries trade disproportionately with each other?
The second puzzle has been identified in, for example,
Frankel6, Deardorff7 and Anderson and Marcouiller3.
Many studies have found that bilateral trade increases
with the levels of GDP per capita in the trading coun-
tries8,9. Deardorff7, for example, has summarized the
stylized facts as follows: ‘high-income countries trade
disproportionately more with all trading partners and not
just among themselves, while low-income countries trade
less’. However, there is no clear theoretical explanation
for the positive effect of per capita income levels on ag-
gregate bilateral trade.
The hypothesis that we will test is that both the
OECD effect and the GDP per capita effect that is typi-
cally found in the gravity literature are driven by the fact
that OECD countries, as well as countries with high per
capita income are in general countries with relatively
good institutions. In other words, we hypothesise that the
results on the OECD effect and the GDP per capita ef-
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fect are due to omitted variable bias, where the OECD
dummy and GDP per capita act as proxies for institutional
quality and institutional homogeneity. We do so by fo-
cusing on the OECD effect and GDP per capita effect in
a standard gravity model and by simultaneously address-
ing the relevance of the quality and homogeneity of in-
stitutions in explaining bilateral trade. We show that the
similarity and high quality of institutions of OECD coun-
tries as well as of countries with a high per capita income
provide a plausible explanation for the positive effects of
the OECD dummy and GDP per capita that have previ-
ously been found in the literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces our gravity model and the data we
have used. Section 3 presents the results. The final sec-
tion summarizes the main findings of the analysis.
2. A GRAVITY APPROACH TO TRADE WITH
INSTITUTIONS
The gravity model of bilateral trade is a successful
tool in empirical accounts of bilateral trade flows. It is
nowadays the workhorse model of applied international
economics10. The gravity model owes its name to Newton’s
model in physics in which the gravitational force between
two bodies positively depends on the mass of those bod-
ies and negatively on their distance. In its most simple
form, a gravity model in international trade defines the
bodies as countries, uses GDP to reflect ‘mass’, and prox-
ies distance by distance between the capitals of the
respective countries. Apart from being successful empiri-
cally, the gravity model in international trade has more
recently also received theoretical support and is firmly
based within a variety of trade theories7. Typical applied
papers in the field elaborate on the before-mentioned most
simple form of the gravity model and incorporate other
proxies for mass and distance. The basic gravity equa-
tion that we will estimate and that incorporates institu-
tional factors looks as follows:
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where i and j denote the exporting and importing coun-
try. The dependent variable Tij is aggregate merchandise
exports from i to j for 1998. The independent variables
are, respectively: national income (Y), the distance be-
tween i and j (Dij), and dummies reflecting whether i and
j share: a land border (Adj), their primary language
(Lang), membership in a regional Preferential Trade
Agreement (PTA), their main religion (Religion), and
whether they were part of a common colonial empire
(Col). These variables are standard in empirical studies
using gravity models to explain variation in trade. The
variables of particular interest in this paper are a variable
to capture institutional quality (Inst) and a dummy indi-
cating whether both countries share a relatively similar
institutional capacity. The final term is the stochastic er-
ror term, which captures all other effects on trade, and is
assumed to be well-behaved. The gravity model estimates
are acquired using OLS.
The data on bilateral merchandise trade are from
the UN COMTRADE database, accessed using the World
Bank WITS interface. Bilateral trade between 109
countries is considered for 1998.*  Data on institutional
quality were collected from the database compiled by
Kaufmann et al.11. They have combined data on the sub-
jective quality of institutions (for 2000-01) into six
equally scaled summary-indicators of different aspects of
governance. Because the separate indicators of gover-
nance are highly correlated, we have taken the sum of the
scores on all indicators as an overall score for the level
of effectiveness of a country’s institutional framework.
The mean value for the composite indicator on institu-
tional effectiveness in our country-sample is 0.97, with
a standard deviation of 5.02. The indicator is scaled from
about −15 to +15. Furthermore, we have defined a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the absolute difference
in institutional quality between countries i and j is lower
than two standard deviations of our indicator. A value of
one indicates that the two countries have a similar level
of institutional quality. For more detailed information on
the data and variables, see the Appendix.
3. RESULTS
This section presents the results of our empirical
analysis. We first show the basic results of the empirical
gravity model discussed in the previous section. Subse-
quently, we address the two puzzles that we identified in
the introduction, viz. the positive effect of OECD mem-
* The available number of country pairs varies across specifications,
because of missing data on bilateral trade and some of the explanatory
variables (GDP, GDP per capita and institutional quality).
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bership on trade and the effect of GDP per capita.
3.1 The effect of institutions
Estimating equation (1) using Ordinary Least Squares
gives rise to the estimated coefficients and associated stan-
dard errors as reported in the first column of Table 1. Our
model explains 66% of the total variation in bilateral
trade, as shown by the value of R2. The results for the
traditional variables are as expected. A one percent in-
crease in GDP of the exporter (importer) increases trade
by 1.19 (0.85)%, whereas a one percent increase in dis-
tance reduces bilateral trade by 1.19%. Also the effects
of a common border, common language, belonging to the
same trade area, sharing a common religion and sharing
a common colonial history as captured by the subsequent
dummy variables in Table 1 are conform expectations:
they all positively influence bilateral trade. To give an
indication of the magnitude of the effect, countries shar-
ing a common language trade – ceteris paribus − 40%
(100 × (e0.34 − 1)) more with each other than countries
that do not share a common language.
Considering the key variables of interest in our
analysis, a high quality of institutions in either the ex-
porting or importing country stimulates trade, as can be
Table 1 Gravity model specifications (dependent variable: log bilateral export)
Spec.1 Spec.2 Spec.3 Spec.4
Constant − 32.02*** − 33.09*** − 32.52*** − 32.57***
(0.51)   (0.51)   (0.52)   (0.52)
Traditional gravity variables
Log GDP Exporter 1.19***  1.23***  1.21***  1.21***
(0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)
Log GDP Importer 0.85***  0.87***  0.87***  0.87***
(0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)
Log Distance − 1.19*** − 1.21*** − 1.22*** − 1.22***
(0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)
Additional proxies for ‘distance’
Common Border  0.97***  0.90***  0.96***  0.96***
 (0.15)   (0.15)   (0.15)   (0.15)
Common Language  0.34***  0.30***  0.35***  0.35***
 (0.10)   (0.10)   (0.10)   (0.10)
Common Trade Bloc  0.85***  0.94***  0.94***  0.94***
(0.09)   (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.09)
Common Religion  0.23***  0.19***  0.25***  0.25***
(0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)
Common Colonizer  0.48***  0.55***  0.44***  0.44***
(0.09)   (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.09)
Institutional variables
Institutional Quality Exporter  0.05***  0.07***  0.07***
(0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)
Institutional Quality Importer  0.04***  0.05***  0.05***
(0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)
Institutional Homogeneity  0.12**  0.11*
 (0.06)   (0.07)
Joint OECD Membership  0.15 − 0.85*** − 0.81***
  (0.13)   (0.14)   (0.15)
Single OECD Membership  0.29*** − 0.17*** − 0.11
  (0.05)   (0.06)   (0.07)
Adjusted R2 0.66  0.65  0.66  0.66
Number of observations 9138 9554  9138 9138
Note: Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Statistical significance is
indicated with stars, where *, ** and *** reflects significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively (two-sided t-test).
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seen from the benchmark specification in the first column
of Table 1. The effect is significant, both statistically and
economically. As an indication of the economic impor-
tance of effective high-quality institutions, we compare
an importing country that has institutional quality of one
standard deviation above the sample mean with a coun-
try that has an average score on institutions. The former
will import about 22% more from any third country than
the latter. Separately from the effect of good quality, bi-
lateral difference in the effectiveness of institutions has
a statistically significant, positive effect on trade as well.
Traders from countries that differ considerably in their
effectiveness of institutions are unfamiliar with each
other’s level of security in exchange. The business pro-
cedures and conventions that they have developed to use
their institutional capacity as effectively as possible are
not compatible2. On the other hand, if institutions are suf-
ficiently similar, familiarity will reduce transaction costs
and raise bilateral trade. Homogeneity of institutions in-
creases trade by an estimated 13% (100 × (e0.12 − 1)).
3.2 The OECD-effect
Next, we turn to the investigation of the puzzle of
the OECD effect as described in Section 1. The key re-
sults are contained in Specifications 2–4 in Table 1. A
first thing to note is that the estimates for the standard
gravity variables (GDP and distance) and the additional
‘standard’ proxies for distance as discussed in Section 3.1
are fairly stable in terms of size as well as significance
of the coefficients.
In order to investigate the effect and meaning of
OECD membership, we start with a standard gravity
model without institutions (Specification 2 in Table 1).
In that case, OECD-membership independently raises
trade above the levels we would expect on the basis of
these countries’ basic characteristics5. OECD-member-
ship seems to create more trade with non-members
(+34%), than with fellow members (+16%), all else equal.
For comparison, Rose’s benchmark specification esti-
mates the effect of joint OECD-membership on trade at
+55%, and the effect of single membership of the OECD
at +49%.*
Adding institutional quality to the model turns the
otherwise robust effect of OECD-membership on trade
completely upside down. The residual effect of OECD-
membership on bilateral trade is strongly and statistically
significantly negative (Specification 3). It is hard to be-
lieve that membership of the OECD negatively influences
trade. Still, the effect seems strong enough to argue that
it is substantive. The estimated effect of institutions re-
mains significantly positive. This corroborates the hypoth-
esis that OECD countries trade more because of their
effective domestic institutions.
In Specification 4, we have also included institu-
tional homogeneity in the gravity model. This does not
change the effect of either the quality of institutions, or
of joint membership in the OECD on trade. However, the
residual effect of single membership on bilateral trade
becomes smaller and statistically insignificant. This sug-
gests that low trade between an OECD-member and a
non-member is partly caused by the difference in insti-
tutional effectiveness.
3.3 GDP per capita effects
Finally, we discuss the GDP per capita effects. As
discussed in Section 1, a variable that is typically included
in standard gravity equations is GDP per capita. The theo-
retical foundation for inclusion of per capita income is
oftentimes not clear. Neither Heckscher-Ohlin theory, nor
the preference-based theory of Linder would predict the
relation between trade and GDP per capita levels found
empirically. These explanations would either predict that
rich countries trade more with poor countries, because of
comparative cost differences, or that rich countries and
poor countries trade more amongst themselves, because
of combined similarities in tastes and comparative costs7.
These patterns both do not accord well with the stylized
facts observed by Deardorff. As shown by Frankel et al.12,
these effects should be properly captured by absolute dif-
ferences in GDP per capita between the trading countries,
rather than the respective levels of per capita income.**
Many studies, alternatively, motivate the inclusion of
GDP per capita levels by arguing that higher income per
capita allows for more specialization and enhances intra-
industry trade in a wider variety of products10,12-14. A
positive effect of GDP per capita would indicate the rel-
* Rose uses panel data, which generates variation over time as well as
across countries. Perhaps the closest comparable specification involves
a cross-section estimate for 1995, reported in his Table 2. Like in our
results, the effect of joint membership on trade (+46%) is lower than the
effect of single membership (+63%).
** At the disaggregate level of trade, there is more reason to include the
level of GDP per capita in both countries as explanatory variables for
sectoral trade. It can, for example, reflect the effect of the extent of
comparative advantage or of preferences for goods from  a particular
sector (vis-à-vis the rest of the world) on the size of a country’s export and
import in that sector. At the aggregate level, however, one has to focus
on bilateral differences in comparative advantages and tastes (reflected
by differences in GDP per capita) to explain aggregate bilateral trade.
This reflects the fact that, at the aggregate level, all countries have
comparative advantages or preferences for something.
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evance of new trade theory models of product differen-
tiation. However, theories of imperfect competition and
trade also do not imply a definite role for income per
capita, as opposed to total domestic income6. Potential
export supply and import demand are already reflected
by the levels of GDP, rather than GDP per capita15. In
fact, these models imply that a smaller country (with
lower GDP) is more specialized, and depends more on
trade for its consumption of a wide variety of products.
In this section, we empirically test the hypothesis
that variation in the quality of institutions between
wealthy and less developed countries offers an explana-
tion for the positive relation between trade and per capita
income levels estimated by standard gravity equations.
Our investigation proceeds as follows. We start from the
basic model with institutions presented in Section 3.1
(specification 1 in Tables 1 and 2). We subsequently
present a standard specification of the gravity model,
without institutions, that includes GDP per capita (of both
the exporting and importing country). In this basic speci-
fication without institutions, income per capita has a
strong and significant, positive effect on bilateral trade.
Table 2 Income per capita and institutions (dependent variable: log bilateral export)
Spec.1a Spec.2 Spec.3 Spec.4
Constant − 32.02*** − 34.59*** − 31.21*** − 31.40***
(0.51)   (0.46)   (0.60)   (0.61)
Traditional gravity variables
Log GDP Exporter  1.19***  1.18***  1.19***  1.19***
(0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)
Log GDP Importer  0.85***  0.84***  0.85***  0.85***
(0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)
Log GDP per capita Exporter  0.21*** − 0.05 − 0.06
  (0.03) (0.05)   (0.05)
Log GDP per capita Importer  0.17*** − 0.01 − 0.01
  (0.03) (0.04)   (0.04)
Log Distance − 1.19*** − 1.17*** − 1.19*** − 1.19***
(0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)
Additional proxies for ‘distance’
Common Border  0.97***  0.90***  0.94***  0.92***
(0.15)   (0.15)   (0.15)   (0.15)
Common Language  0.34***  0.24**  0.28***  0.28***
(0.10)   (0.11)   (0.11)   (0.11)
Common Trade Bloc  0.85***  0.86***  0.85***  0.83***
(0.09)   (0.08)   (0.09)   (0.09)
Common Religion  0.23***  0.22***  0.21***  0.21***
(0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)
Common Colonizer  0.48***  0.65***  0.53***  0.53***
(0.09)   (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.09)
Institutional variables
Institutional Quality Exporter  0.05***  0.07***  0.07***
(0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)
Institutional Quality Importer  0.04***  0.05***  0.05***
(0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)
Institutional Homogeneity  0.12**  0.16***
(0.06)   (0.06)
Adjusted R2 0.66  0.67  0.67  0.67
Number of observations 9,138  9,006  8,715  8,715
Note: Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Statistical significance is
indicated with asterisks, where *, ** and *** reflects significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively (two-sided t-test).
a
 This specification is equivalent to Specification 1 in Table 1 and is only included here for presentational convenience.
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This is the finding that has been reported frequently in
other gravity model studies and that we alluded to in Sec-
tion 1. Our estimates in Specifications 3 and 4 show that
the positive effect of income per capita is not robust to
the introduction of institutions. When both are included,
per capita income turns out to have a negative and insig-
nificant effect on trade, whereas quality and similarity of
institutions still have a significantly positive and robust
effect on trade.
We thus find that institutions are dominant in ex-
plaining why rich countries trade more in general. After
controlling for the effectiveness of institutions, rich coun-
tries have lower trade than expected, although the effect
is small and statistically imprecise. Anderson and
Marcouiller3 argue that excluding institutional effective-
ness from the gravity model can obscure a negative rela-
tion between income per capita and expenditure shares
on traded merchandize, because of the high correlation
between per capita income and the quality of governance.
This relation between the share of expenditure on traded
merchandize and GDP per capita results from a shift in
the structure of production and consumption, from com-
modities into services. The shift in expenditure shares of-
fers an explanation for the finding that wealthy countries
engage in less commodity trade, all else equal, after the
effects of institutions have been included.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Institutions that reduce uncertainty in exchange and
lower transaction costs matter for international trade.
Moreover, similarity of the institutional environment, in
terms of the security of property rights and contract en-
forceability, raises bilateral trade by lowering unfamiliar-
ity and transaction costs. This provides support for the
view that intangible, largely unobserved barriers to trade
help explain why trade costs remain large, offering in-
sights in the true mechanisms that explain variation in bi-
lateral trade. The results in this paper thus underline the
relevance of investing in good governance in order to in-
crease the potential to benefit from international trade.
Apart from this conclusion, we can exploit the no-
tion that informal trade barriers matter to provide insight
into two puzzles in the empirical literature on bilateral
trade. Both member countries of the OECD and countries
with a high GDP per capita trade more than basic grav-
ity variables can explain. This paper has shown that varia-
tion in the quality of domestic institutions explains why
wealthy countries in general, and OECD-countries in par-
ticular, are relatively attractive trade partners. Institutions
that are effective in the defence of property rights de-
crease the insecurity of international transactions, and
lower transaction costs. As a result, bilateral trade is more
beneficial. If we include measures of institutional effec-
tiveness in an otherwise standard gravity model, they turn
out to be positively and significantly related to bilateral
trade flows. The residual effect of OECD-membership on
bilateral trade with both a fellow OECD-country and a
non-OECD country is significantly negative. Moreover,
the impact of GDP per capita turns insignificant and nega-
tive once institutional variables are taken into account by
the model. Both findings may reflect the influence of a
shift in production and expenditure towards services and
non-tradeables with rising per capita incomes.
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APPENDIX : DESCRIPTION OF DATA
In the empirical analysis, we make use of both
country-specific and bilateral data from various sources.
Gross domestic product for exporting and importing
countries are examples of country-specific variables. Geo-
graphical distance, adjacency, main language and religion,
amongst others, are examples of other characteristics that
we take into account for each pair of countries. We will
now describe the data in more detail.
We use bilateral exports as the dependent variable,
such that each country pair yields two observations,
with either country as exporter or importer. We have
used UN data on bilateral trade flows in 1998, for a
set of more than 100 countries. The figures focus on
merchandise trade only.
For information on the level of GDP and GDP per
capita, data from the World Development Indicators
(Worldbank 2000, on CD Rom) were used for 1998.
For institutional quality, we have used the most re-
cent and comprehensive data-set on the quality of gov-
ernance available. This database was constructed for
the World Bank by Kaufmann et al.11. Indicators from
17 different sources, constructed by 15 organisations
have been combined. The data-set consists of six in-
dicators of perceived institutional quality. Each indi-
cator captures some related aspects of the quality of
governance. They either reflect the political process,
the quality of the state apparatus and its policies, or
the success of governance. We discuss these indica-
tors in turn:
‘Voice and Accountability’ reflects the extent to
which citizens can participate in selecting gov-
ernment and hold it accountable for the actions
taken. This score includes various characteristics
of the political process as well as assessments of
the independence of the media. It reflects whether
citizens and business can prevent arbitrariness in
the behaviour of government and enforce good
governance when needed.
‘Political Stability’ refers to the perceived likeli-
hood of the government being destabilised or
overthrown by unconstitutional interference or
excesses of violence against persons and posses-
sions. These factors are highly detrimental for the
continuity of policy and the stability of the eco-
nomic environment.
‘Government Effectiveness’ is a measure for the
quality of government inputs. It represents,
amongst others, the perceived quality and inde-
pendence of the bureaucracy. This indicates the
ability of government to formulate and imple-
ment good policies.
‘Regulatory Quality’ is directly focused on the
quality of implemented policies. It includes the
perceived incidence of policies that inhibit the
market mechanism, and excessive regulation of
foreign trade and business development and as
such closely reflects the transaction costs that re-
sult from policy intrusion by the state in private
trade.
‘Rule of Law’ indicates the quality of the legal
system. It indicates society’s perceived success
in upholding fair and predictable rules for social
and economic interaction. Essentially, it focuses
on the quality of the legal system and the enforce-
ability of contracts.
‘Control of Corruption’ represents the extent of
‘lawless’ or unfair behaviour in public-private
interactions. It complements regulatory quality
and rule of law indicators, pointing at the impact
of bad governance on economic interaction. Cor-
ruption, like regulatory intrusion, affects transac-
tion costs by adding a ‘third-party’ involvement
to private transaction. An added component of
corruption to trading costs is its arbitrary, uncer-
tain nature.
The data on geographical distance, common border,
common primary language, common trade agreement,
common dominant religion and common colonial his-
tory have been collected from diverse sources, such
as the data-set used by Sala-i-Martin16,*, for religions
and colonial backgrounds, and John Haveman’s In-
ternational Trade Data for distance, language and
* See www.columbia.edu/~xs23/data.htm.
** See www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/
Trade.Resources/TradeData.html.
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contiguity.** This part of our database is available
upon request from the corresponding author. Some re-
marks on these variables are in place:
Many costs of trade are related to geographical
distance, from physical transport costs of goods
and persons to the costs of cultural unfamiliar-
ity. As conventional in the literature, geographi-
cal distance has been measured as the distance
from home to foreign ‘as the bird flies’, using the
principal city of each country as its centre of grav-
ity. This implies that the distance between the
two centres of gravity of neighbouring countries
is likely to overestimate the average distance of
trade between them. The argument that the dis-
tance measure used leads to an overestimate of
the distance of trade holds true for all pairs of
countries. However, its relative impact is much
larger in neighbouring countries than in countries
that are far away from each other. Not all coun-
tries in our dataset were represented in the data-
base for bilateral distances. For these countries,
proxies were constructed using distances from
neighbouring countries that were included in the
database. For more discussion of the use and use-
fulness of other, more sophisticated measures of
geographical distance, see Frankel6. In general,
more sophisticated measures do not change the
estimation results much, and cannot eliminate the
measurement error for contiguous countries ei-
ther.
The common land border dummy indicates
whether two countries are adjacent. Measurement
error in the distance variable, as well as the effect
of historical relations between adjacent countries
are captured by this dummy-variable. For coun-
tries in our data set that had no adjacency data
available from the main source, the CIA factbook
(www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook) was
used to determine whether they shared borders
with any other country in the data set.
To assess commonality in primary language,
we used a database that distinguished fourteen
languages: Arabic, Burmese, Chinese, Dutch,
English, French, German, Greek, Korean, Malay,
Persian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish. In
case none of these applied or no data were avail-
able, the categories ‘other language’ and ‘non
available’ were assigned. Using the CIA factbook,
these countries have been checked. A dummy
variable reflects whether or not two countries
have the same primary language, an important
aspect of cultural similarity.
Whether pairs of countries take part in common
trade agreements has been assessed using OECD
data on major regional integration agreements.*
A dummy variable (common trade bloc) indicates
whether a pair of countries enters into at least one
common regional Preferential Trade Agreement.
Cultural and/or historical ties between countries
may also consist of a common dominant religion
or a shared colonial past. Data for religion and
colonial background have been taken from Sala-
i-Martin16. Percentages of the population that ad-
here to one of seven major religions are presented.
These religions are: Buddhism, Catholicism,
Confucianism, Hinduism, Judism religion, Islam,
and Protestantism. For some countries, two reli-
gions were equally dominant over the others.
These countries entered into the analysis with
both religions as the dominant religion. Common-
ality of dominant religion implies a value of 1 for
the dummy variable ‘common religion’.
The dummy variable ‘common colonizer’ reflects
for each pair of countries whether both of them
share a similar colonial history. The data consid-
ered the British, French and Spanish empires
only. We also included the colonizers themselves
into the respective empires, contrary to the origi-
nal source. In this way, the figures identify shared
colonial relations for pairs of countries.
* See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/37/1923431.pdf.
